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NOTES

How Can Japanese Corporations
Protect Confidential Information
in U.S. Courts? Recognition of the
Attorney-Client
Privilege
for
Japanese Non-Bengoshi In-House
Lawyers in the Development of a
New Legal System
ABSTRACT

U.S. courts have seen a significant increase in the number
of lawsuits involving both U.S. and Japanese corporations. In
deciding these cases, U.S. courts may have to choose how to
apply the attorney-client privilege to in-house lawyers retained
by corporationsin Japan, where the legal system and discovery
rules are fundamentally different from those of the United
States. U.S. courts would most likely analyze these situations
under the Remy-Martin/Minolta test and recognize the attorneyclient privilege only for managers of legal departments in
Japanese corporations,not for other non-bengoshi (non-licensed)
in-house lawyers. This will change in the near future, however,
when Japanese corporationsstart to retain bengoshi, graduates
from new Japanese law schools, as in-house lawyers.
Meanwhile, Japanese corporations may still be able to protect
confidential information by using legal managers, U.S. and
Japanese licensed in-house lawyers, in-house lawyers acting as
agents, and Upjohn memoranda. The Japanese government
may also be able to support Japanese corporations by signing
the Hague Evidence Convention with declaration and
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reservation, amending the Code of Civil Procedure provision
regarding privilege, and most importantly, raising the bar
passage rate for graduates of Japanese law schools. These
measures would more likely protect confidential corporate
information, regardless of whether U.S. courts recognize the
attorney-client privilege for Japanese non-bengoshi in-house
lawyers.
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I. INTRODUCTION

What is the Japanese equivalent to a lawyer or attorney? The
general answer is bengoshi.1 In the corporate transactional context,
however, "Japanese lawyer" does not necessarily mean "Japanese
bengoshi" because Japanese lawyer includes both Japanese bengoshi
and Japanese non-bengoshi.2 This distinction significantly affects the
analysis of whether the attorney-client privilege applies to
communications between a Japanese corporation and its nonbengoshi (i.e., non-licensed) in-house lawyers. Should the attorneyclient privilege be applied to all Japanese in-house lawyers (i.e., both
licensed and non-licensed lawyers)? Will the analysis change with
the development of new Japanese law schools opened in 2004? What
can a Japanese corporation and the Japanese government do to
protect confidential corporate information in U.S. courts?
Because many multinational corporations 3 have entered into
transactions, U.S. courts have seen a significant increase in the
number of lawsuits involving both U.S. and foreign corporations,
What happens if a U.S.
particularly Japanese corporations. 4

1.
See, e.g., Constance O'Keefe, Legal Education in Japan, 72 OR. L. REV.
1009, 1009 (1993) ('The term bengoshi is often translated 'lawyer,' ...").
2.
While bengoshi is a licensed lawyer, there are many non-bengoshi (i.e., nonlicensed) in-house lawyers working at Japanese corporations. See infra Part III.C
(discussing traditional Japanese in-house lawyers). I was one of these non-bengoshi inhouse lawyers.
"[M]ultinational corporations may be broadly defined as affiliated
3.
corporations conducting a common enterprise and under common control although
17 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL.,
incorporated in different jurisdictions."
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8926.10 (perm. ed.,
rev. vol. 1998).
4.
See Jacqueline M. Efron, Comment, The Transnational Application of
Sexual HarassmentLaws: A CulturalBarrierin Japan, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 133,
163-65 (1999) (explaining the anticipated increase in employment discrimination
litigation against Japanese corporations and necessities of preventive measures); Eric
Sibbitt, The New World of Corporate Lawyering in Japan, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 503, 507,
510 (2002) (observing the cross-border legal services due to increased exposure of
Japanese corporations to litigation associated with a public offering in the United
States). For recent cases involving both United States and Japanese corporations, see,
for example, Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., 72 F. App'x
916 (4th Cir. 2003); Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 348 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir.
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corporation sues a Japanese corporation in a U.S. federal court? U.S.
discovery rules are generally more liberal than those of foreign
countries, providing few barriers to total disclosure. 5 The attorney6
client privilege is the oldest privilege among U.S. discovery rules.
By contrast, the scope of discovery in Japan is far narrower than that
in the United States, and Japan does not have the same type of
7
pretrial discovery as the United States.
During discovery in a U.S. court, a U.S. corporation may request
8
all documents that are "related to the claim or defense of any party.

The Japanese corporation might resist producing the documents,
invoking the attorney-client privilege for communications with its inhouse lawyers. 9 However, most of the in-house lawyers are nonbengoshi in Japan, 10 so the U.S. corporation could refute this defense
on the grounds that Japanese lawyers are not admitted to the
The court would be forced to decide whether the
Japanese bar."
attorney-client privilege applies to the communications between the
Japanese corporation and its in-house lawyers. There are strong
arguments that U.S. courts should compel disclosure if the evidence
Some courts have even denied foreign
is vital to the case. 12
13
confidential legal communications.
their
for
protection
corporations
In Japan, because of the limited number of bengoshi, various

types of non-bengoshi perform functions usually performed by U.S.

2003); Eisai Ltd. v.Dr.Reddy's Laboratories, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Murata ManufacturingCo. v. Bel Fuse Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2005 WL 281217 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 3, 2005).
5.
See CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN 244 (2003) ("Discovery
rules in the United States are quite liberal-indeed the most liberal in the world.").
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); EDNA SELAN
6.
EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 2 (4th
ed. 2001).
7.
GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 248. But, to the extent that the preliminary
hearing is considered "pretrial," the judge may order document production. Id.
8.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
9.
For cases where a foreign corporation invoked attorney-client privilege, see,
for example, Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del. 1982).
10.
See Richard S. Miller, Apples vs. Persimmons: The Legal Profession in
Japan and the United States, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 31 (1989) (discussing typical
Japanese in-house lawyers).
11.
In Remy Martin, a U.S. corporation, Renfield, claimed that French in-house
lawyers of a French corporation, Remy Martin, were not members of a bar, thus the
privilege was unavailable. 98 F.R.D. at 444; see also infra Part V.B (discussing Remy
Martin).
Jack B. Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the
12.
See, e.g.,
Privileges of Another Jurisdiction, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 539 (1956) (claiming that
U.S. courts should compel disclosure of vital information, even if it would expose a
party to liability abroad).
13.
See, e.g., Status Time Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (holding that attorney-client privilege did not apply to communications between
Japanese corporation, Sharp Electronics, and its in-house patent lawyers because they
were not members of a bar of the United States).
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lawyers. 14 Legal education in Japan was fundamentally different
from that in the United States before 2004, because a law degree in
Japan was predominantly an undergraduate degree 15 and education
was largely separate from practical legal training. 16 In April 2004,
however, sixty-eight new law schools modeled on the U.S. system
opened 17 to increase the number of bengoshi and the importance of
the law in Japan.1 8 Thus, a drastic change is expected in the number
and role of in-house lawyers in Japanese corporations.
This Note explains that U.S. courts would likely extend the
attorney-client privilege to a non-bengoshi manager of a legal
department of a Japanese corporation but not to most of the other
non-bengoshi in-house lawyers working there. Part II provides an
overview of the attorney-client privilege in the United States. Part
III explores the Japanese legal system including the discovery rules,
development of legal education, and roles of in-house lawyers. Part
IV discusses various approaches taken by U.S. courts to the
application of the attorney-client privilege for foreign legal
professionals. Part V focuses on two cases from U.S. federal courts
applying one of these approaches, and examines arguments for and
against the recognition of the privilege for Japanese non-bengoshi inhouse lawyers. Part VI analyses which approach U.S. courts would
likely take and what Japanese corporations and governments could
do to protect confidential corporate information.

II. AN

OVERVIEW OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
THE UNITED STATES

A. Defining and Justifying the Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege protecting
confidential communications. 19 Wigmore formulated the attorneyclient privilege as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance

14.
Miller, supra note 10, at 29-30.
15.
See id. at 30 (describing legal education in Japan).
16.
James R. Maxeiner & Keiichi Yamanaka, The New Japanese Law Schools:
Putting the Professional into Legal Education, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 303, 304
(2004).
17.
Jeff Kingston, Japan Speeds up the Process of Reinventing Itself, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2005, at A9.
18.
Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 16, at 310.
19.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); EPSTEIN, supra note
6, at 2.
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permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
20
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.

Under the modern approach, there are only four basic elements
required to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege: (1)
a communication; (2) made between privileged persons; (3) in
confidence; (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
assistance for the client. 2 1 The party asserting the privilege must
raise and demonstrate each element of the privilege explicitly,
22
affirmatively, and in a timely manner.
First, a communication is "any expression through which a
privileged person .. .undertakes to convey information to another
privileged person, and any documents or other records revealing such
an expression." 23 Second, privileged persons are "the client (including
a prospective client), the client's lawyer, agents of either who
facilitate communications between them, and agents of the lawyer
who facilitate the representation. '24 Third, a communication is in
confidence if "at the time and in the circumstances of the
communication, the communicating person reasonably believes that
no one will learn the contents of the communication except a
privileged person ...or another person within whom communications
are protected under a similar privilege." 25 Finally, a communication
is made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance "if it
is made to or to assist a person: (1) who is a lawyer or who the client
or prospective client reasonably believes to be a lawyer; and (2) whom
the client or prospective client consults for the purpose of obtaining
'26
legal assistance.
The main purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage
clients to make full and honest disclosure to their attorneys and
thereby promote broader public interest in the observance of the
law. 27 The rationale is premised upon three assumptions. First,
complying with obligations under modern complex law and
uncertainty about the law make it necessary for clients to consult
lawyers. 28 Second, a client who consults lawyers would not be able to

20.
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (John T. McNaughton rev.,
1961).
21.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000).
22.
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 28-34.
23.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 (2000).
24.
Id. § 70.
25.
Id. § 71.
26.
Id. § 72.
27.
Id. § 68 cmt. c; Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. For other purposes, see, for
example, Alison M. Hill, Comment, A Problem of Privilege: In-House Counsel and the
Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States and the European Community, 27 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 145, 177 (1995) (explaining the idea that the client should have
autonomy as to who can have access to confidential information).
28.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c.
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obtain adequate legal assistance without disclosing all of the facts. 29
Finally, clients would be unwilling to disclose all facts unless they
30
could be assured the privilege.
By contrast, as Wigmore noted, the attorney-client privilege
could obstruct the administration of justice by violating the public's
"right to every man's evidence."'3 1 The privilege, therefore, "should be
recognized only within the narrowest limits required by principle,"
and "[t]he investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial
'32
duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges.
For example, in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., the
court denied expansion of the attorney-client privilege to a
communication between a corporation and its in-house patent
lawyer. 33 Thus, the critical issue is defining who should be an
"attorney" to promote public interest without obstructing the
administration of justice.
While each state in the United States has its own rules, Rule 501
of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the privilege in U.S. federal
courts. 34 Rule 501 provides that "the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by
the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. '35 The U.S. Supreme Court in Upjohn interpreted Rule
501 to allow courts to decide the applicability of the privilege on a
case-by-case basis. 36
As a result, U.S. federal courts have
experienced some uncertainty as to the scope of the attorney-client
37
privilege.
For example, is a law graduate who has yet to be licensed an
"attorney"?
To be protected by the attorney-client privilege, a
communication must be made to someone who is duly licensed as an
attorney when the communication is made. 38 The privilege does not
39
apply retroactively, even if the person later obtains a license.
Therefore, a law school graduate who has not been admitted to the

29.
30.

Id.
Id.

WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2192.
32.
Id. § 2192(3).
33.
89 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Mass. 1950).
34.
James N. Willi, Proposalfor a Uniform Federal Common Law of AttorneyClient Privilege for Communications with U.S. and Foreign Patent Practitioners, 13
31.

TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 279, 289-90 (2005).
35.
FED. R. EVID. 501.

36.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1981).
37.
See id. (noting that a case-by-case basis may undermine desirable certainty
to some extent).
38.
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 137.
39.
Id.
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bar may not be considered an "attorney," at least for the purpose of
40
the privilege.
U.S. courts, however, have recognized the extension of the
privilege to a certain class of agents and subordinates such as
summer associates, paralegals, and secretaries who are working
under the direct control and supervision of a lawyer. 41 The privilege,
therefore, could be extended to such "not-yet-lawyers" under the
agency theory that they are working as agents of other admitted
lawyers. 42 Otherwise, the privilege does not generally extend to nonattorneys, no matter how experienced or knowledgeable they may
be. 43 For example, although some non-lawyers, such as "jail-house"
lawyers or police officers, give legal advice on occasion, no privilege
will be extended to such non-lawyers. 4 4 Some U.S. state courts
suggested the possibility of extending the privilege to a
communication between an insurer and an insured, 45 but U.S. federal
courts will not extend the privilege in the insurance context, because
46
no encompassing privilege between insurer and insured exists.
B. Recognition of the Attorney-Client Privilegefor In-House Lawyers
In a corporate transactional context, whether an in-house lawyer
is an attorney for purposes of the privilege is a crucial issue. The
privilege may apply to a communication between a U.S. corporation
and its in-house lawyer. 47 In Upjohn, the U.S. Supreme Court held

40.
EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORKPRODUCT DOCTRINE 23 (4th ed. Supp. 2004); see, e.g., Fin. Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. Smith,
No. 99 CIV. 9351 GEL RLE, 2000 WL 1855131, at *1, *6-*7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2000)
(holding that communications between a corporate client and an unadmitted law school
graduate are not privileged even though he has passed the bar examination).
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 147; see, e.g., U.S. v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d
41.
Cir. 1961) (extending the attorney-client privilege to an accountant who worked under
the direction of an attorney).
EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 23.
42.
43.
EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 24; see, e.g., HPD Labs., Inc. v. Clorox Co., 202
F.R.D. 410, 411, 415 (D.N.J. 2001) (denying the extension of the privilege to a member
of an in-house legal team, who serves as a specialist for regulatory matters, because
employee sought merely her own legal views not legal advice).
44.
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 141-42.
45.
See, e.g., Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[Wlhere the insured communicates
with the insurer for the express purpose of seeking legal advice with respect to a
concrete claim, or for the purpose of aiding an insurer-provided attorney in preparing a
specific legal case, the law would exalt form over substance if it were to deny
application of the attorney-client privilege.").
46.
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 142-43. But see, e.g., Long v. Anderson Univ.,
204 F.R.D. 129, 135 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (holding that statements from the insured to the
insurer given under a duty to defend was protected by the attorney-client privilege).
47.
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 143-44; see also Rager v. Boise Cascade Corp.,
No. 88 C 1436, 1988 WL 84724, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 1988) ('There is no question that
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that the attorney-client privilege did apply to in-house lawyers who
were licensed in
the United States. 48
Upjohn involved
communications between managers of foreign subsidiaries and inhouse counsel, concerning questionable payments to foreign
officials. 49 The in-house counsel was a member of the Michigan and
New York Bars and had been the corporation's General Counsel for
twenty years. 50 The court found that the General Counsel who
conducted the investigation was in a position to give legal advice to
the board members and that employees were aware they were being
51
questioned so that the board members could obtain legal advice.
The Court did not lay down broad rules regarding the
applicability of the privilege to in-house lawyers but provided some
guiding principles: (1) the control group is not the appropriate
criteria; (2) the applicability of the corporate attorney-client privilege
should be determined on a case-by-case basis; and (3) the privilege
exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to clients
who rely on it, but also the giving of information to the lawyers who
52
give sound and informed advice.
Although U.S. federal courts make no distinction between
outside and in-house lawyers when determining the applicability of
the privilege, in-house lawyers often provide clients both legal and
business advice in practice. 53 While communications made for the
purpose of seeking legal advice from in-house lawyers are protected,
communications made for a purely business purpose will not be
54
protected.
In an increasingly complex business world, even the work of a
strictly legal counselor must be closely enmeshed with the business
transactions of the corporation.5 5 Thus, a problem may arise over
whether an in-house lawyer acted as legal counsel or business
advisor. 56 U.S. federal courts recognize this blurry line between legal
and business advice. While all courts place the burden of establishing
the privilege on the party asserting it, some courts demand a "clear

the communications between the in-house counsel of a corporation and at least some of
the corporation's employees and agents are protected by the attorney-client privilege.").
48.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not
decided how the attorney-client privilege applies internationally. See infra Parts V-V
(discussing transnational application of the privilege).
49.
449 U.S. at 386-87.
50.
Id. at 386.
51.
Id. at 394.
52.
Id. at 396-97.
53.
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 141.
54.
Id.
55.
1 JOHN K. VILLA, CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDELINES § 1.16 (Supp. 2005).
The distinction, however, is not always difficult to make; for example, tax advice or an
opinion on lawfulness of a particular transaction is clearly legal advice. Id.
56.
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 141.
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showing" that the advice was given in a professional capacity. 5 7 The
Restatement emphasizes clients' reasonable expectation and requires
that they must consult the lawyer "not predominantly for another
58
purpose."
Whether a purpose is significantly that of obtaining legal assistance or
is for a nonlegal purpose depends upon the circumstances, including the
extent to which the person performs legal and nonlegal work, the
nature of the communication in question, and whether or not the
person had previously provided legal assistance relating to the same
59
matter.

U.S. courts, therefore, will not extend the privilege when a
sophisticated corporate client tries to involve in-house lawyers merely
to hide embarrassing information, rather than to obtain legal
For example, one court denied the privilege when a
advice. 60
corporation attempted to protect documents with the following
instructions: "Also, unless instructed otherwise, any written
correspondence you author, whether by letter, memo, Excel
spreadsheet, e-mail, etc., should be directed to my attention (at least
as one of the recipients) to assure that the attorney-client privilege is
61
retained."
Thus, in the United States, where in-house lawyers are licensed,
the attorney-client privilege is generally applicable. But should U.S.
courts apply the same privilege to in-house lawyers from a country
that has a fundamentally different legal system?

57.
E.g., In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ('The Company can
shelter [in-house lawyer's] advice only upon a clear showing that [she] gave it in a
professional legal capacity."); SEC v. Gulf & W. Indus. Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 683
(D.D.C. 1981) ('They have not clearly shown, as they are required to show, that this
alleged 'advice' was given by [their in-house lawyer] in a professional legal capacity.");
United States v. Chevron Corp., No. C-94-1885 SBA, 1996 WL 264769, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 13, 1996) ("While an attorney's status as in-house counsel does not dilute the
attorney-client privilege . . .a corporation must make a clear showing that in-house
counsel's advice was given in a professional legal capacity.").
58.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 & cmt. c

(2000).
Id. § 72 cmt. c; see also Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, No. 9759.
602 (PLF/JMF), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11870, at *16 n.4 (D.D.C. June 9, 1998) ("I
know of no principle that would have the existence of the privilege to turn on bar
membership in the state where the advice is rendered .... The privilege should fairly
turn on the client's reasonableperception of whether she is dealing with a person who
appears to be authorized to provide legal advice, not on the arcane question of bar
membership in the state where the advice is rendered.") (emphasis added).
60.
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 161.
61.
Bell Microproducts, Inc. v. Relational Funding Corp., No. 02 C 329, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18121, at *3-*4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2002).
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III. AN

OVERVIEW OF THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM

A. Discovery in Japan
Both Japan and the United States have discovery, but the rules
governing discovery in the two countries vary fundamentally. 62 In
Japan, the procedure is not adversarial, but rather resembles an
inquest where the judge plays a significant role in requiring the
production of evidence considered important, and the lawyers play a
much more cooperative role. 63 Japanese discovery rules under Minji
Sosh5h6 (the Code of Civil Procedure or CCP) are much more limited
than those in the United States. 64 There are no depositions, and
discovery is still limited, although it has become somewhat broader
65
under the new CCP.
There are at least five reasons why such great differences exist.
First, the Japanese system was modeled after the German civil law
system, which has traditionally limited discovery. 66 Second, because
there is no jury system in Japan, there is no need to have a short and
quick trial.67 Third, the burden of proof required to maintain a suit is
not judged until all evidence has been evaluated by the judge, so
there is little pressure on parties to discover evidence that could be
procured at a trial stage.6 8 Fourth, the aversion to confrontation
among Japanese people often leads to settlement before trial. 69
Finally, because appellate courts in Japan may conduct fact finding
as courts of first instance, the first trial tends to serve as a form of
70
discovery.
In the United States, discovery from non-U.S. defendants is
governed according to either the Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence

62.
GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 245; see also Craig P. Wagnild, Civil Law
Discovery in Japan: A Comparison of Japanese and U.S. Methods of Evidence
Collection in Civil Litigation, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 2 (2002) ("It may therefore
be said that while systematic differences profoundly influence the form and extent of
discovery practice in Japan, Japanese attorneys do 'discover' evidence, including
documents, witnesses, and physical evidence, for use in civil trials.").
63.
GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 245-46.
64.
Id. at 247-48.
65.
Id. at 248.
66.
Wagnild, supra note 62, at 16.
67.
GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 245. The Japanese Diet, however, passed an act
creating a jury-like scheme on May 21, 2004. For a discussion of the new system, see
generally Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participationin the Japanese Justice
System: A Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System (Saiban-In
Seido) from Domestic Historicaland InternationalPsychologicalPerspectives, 37 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 935 (2004).
68.
Wagnild, supra note 62, at 17.
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 18.
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72
Convention) 7 1 or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).
Japan, however, has yet to sign the Hague Evidence Convention,
though calls for Japan to join the Convention are persistent. 73
Instead, the United States and Japan have signed a bilateral treaty
as to the gathering of evidence.7 4 Although this treaty allows a U.S.
litigant to take evidence directly in Japan according to the FRCP, 75 it
does not solve all major obstacles. U.S. courts have no authority to
76
compel compliance with U.S. rules.
The Japanese legislatures, however, somewhat liberalized the
restrictive Japanese discovery system by the enactment of the new
CCP on January 1, 1998. 77 The new CCP made all documents
possessed by private parties presumptively discoverable, thus
reversing the presumption of the limited scope of Japanese
78
discovery.

B. The Attorney-Client Privilege in Japan
Though Japan has discovery rules different from those of the
United States, 79 the Japanese attorney-client privielge laws are
somewhat similar to those in the United States. First, Bengoshi H5
(Lawyers Law),8 0 which applies to all Japanese bengoshi as an ethics
code, provides that bengoshi have an obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of information acquired during the course of their
duties.81 In addition, Benrishi H5 (Patent Lawyers Law),8 2 which
applies to all Japanese benrishi (licensed patent lawyers), provides
83
similar rules.

71.
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231
[hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention].
72.
Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S.
522, 541 (1987).
73.
Wagnild, supra note 62, at 19.
74.
Consular Convention and Protocol, U.S.-Japan, Mar. 22, 1963, 15 U.S.T.
768.
75.
Id. at art. 17(1)(e)(ii)-(iii).
76.
Wagnild, supra note 62, at 20.
77.
Toshiro M. Mochizuki, Baby Step or Giant Leap?: Parties' Expanded Access
to Documentary Evidence Under the New Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, 40 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 285, 286 (1999).
78.
Id. at 286-87.
79.
See supra Part III.A (discussing the difference between U.S. and Japanese
discovery rules).
80.
Law No. 205 of 1949 (Japan).
81.
Id. at art. 23.
82.
Law No. 49 of 2000, art. 30 (Japan).
83.
Benrishi handles the legal work and gives advice on matters relating to
patent prosecution, infringement and invalidity. For the more detailed description, see
generally Daiske Yoshida, Note, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Communications with Foreign Legal Professionals, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 220-24
(1997).
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Under the old CCP, a party may not refuse to produce a
document only if the requesting party cited the document, if the
requesting party has a right to demand its production, or if the
document is written in the interest of the requesting party.8 4 In other
words, the old CCP did not require any other documents to be
produced. Thus, one could have argued that any documents,
including communications between a corporation and its in-house
lawyer, whether she is licensed or not, are all presumptively
85
privileged under the old CCP.
The new CCP, however, added a requirement that parties shall
produce all other documents relevant to a case. 8 6 Exceptions to this
general obligation include documents that contain information the
holder received in the line of duty as a "professional. '8 7 Professional
includes bengoshi and benrishi,88 so communications between a
corporation and bengoshi or benrishi are privileged under the current
Japanese law. By contrast, non-bengoshi in-house lawyers are not
included in the definition of professional. 89 Therefore, the attorneyclient privilege under the current Japanese law does not protect
communications between a corporation and non-bengoshi in-house
lawyers.
C. TraditionalIn-House Lawyers in Japan
Because of the limited number of bengoshi in Japan, non-lawyers
perform many functions usually performed by lawyers in the United
States.9 0
Members of an in-house legal department have been
typically non-bengoshi, but graduates of the undergraduate law
faculty who have decided not to study for Shih6 Shiken (Japanese Bar
exam) or have given up trying to pass. 91 These non-bengoshi perform
many of the similar functions that in-house lawyers in the United
States would do, such as documenting, negotiating, and giving advice
92
to various departments in a corporation.

84.

KYf-MINSOHO [Old Code of Civil Procedure], art. 312(1)-(3) (Japan).

85.

See YASUHIRO FUJITA, NICHI/BEI KOKUSAI SOSH

No JITSUMU To RONTEN

[TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: US/JAPAN, PRACTICES AND ISSUES] 279 (1998) (Japan).
86.
MINSOHO [Code of Civil Procedure], art. 220(4) (Japan).
87.
Id. at arts. 197(2), 220(4).
88.
Id. at art. 197(2).
Id.
89.
90.
Miller, supra note 10, at 29-30. In addition to bengoshi, benrishi (patent
lawyer) and non-bengoshi in-house lawyer, Japan has professionals known as Shih6
Syoshi (judicial scrivener) who prepare legal documents and Zeirishi (tax lawyer) who
perform many functions that are handled by licensed lawyers in the United States.
GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 136-37.
91.
GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 136.
92.
Id.
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Although Lawyers Law requires bengoshi to provide legal
services to the general public, 93 it does not prohibit companies from
retaining non-bengoshi in-house lawyers to obtain legal advice for
their own corporate matters. 94 Most companies have been reluctant
to hire bengoshi in-house lawyers, because they have to obtain prior
approval from the Japanese Bar Association and guarantee wages
equivalent to those of outside lawyers. 95 According to the Justice
System Reform Council (JSRC), there are about 3,500 listed
companies in Japan. 96 Among them, about 1,100 companies have a
legal department. 97 While 7,000 to 8,000 employees work as in-house
lawyers, only fifty-six of them are bengoshi.98 The traditional roles of
in-house lawyers, however, may drastically change due to the birth of
law schools in Japan.
D. Legal Education in JapanBefore 2004
What differentiates the nature of the in-house lawyers in Japan
and those in the United States? Legal education in Japan was
fundamentally different from that in the United States. 99 A law
degree in Japan was predominantly an undergraduate one, 100 and
education there has largely been separate from practical legal
training of prospective bengoshi.10 1 There are approximately 45,000
law-major students at nearly 100 universities with an undergraduate
law faculty.10 2
Among them, six schools have been the most
prestigious "brand" schools in terms of bar passage rate and the
quality of faculty: Tokyo, Waseda, Keio, Kyoto, Chuo, and
Hitotsubashi.10 3 The main purpose of education there is not to
provide practical training to become a lawyer, but to teach law as one
of the liberal arts.10 4 Teaching methods follow the typical Japanese

93.

Law No. 205 of 1949, art. 72 (Japan).

94.

FuJITA, supra note 85, at 280.

95.
Id. at 280-81.
96.
Memorandum from H5s5 Seido Kent5kai Dai Nana Kai [7th Justice System
Reform Discussion] (July 22, 2002) (Japan), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai7/7gijiroku.html [hereinafter JSRC Memorandum].
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.

100.
Japan).
101.
102.
103.

GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 136.

Id.; see also Miller, supra note 10, at 30 (describing legal education in
Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 16, at 304.
Id. at 309.
MASAHIRO

MURAKAMI,

H6KA-DAIGAKUIN

[LAW

SCHOOL IN JAPAN]

129

(2003) (Japan).
104.
Id. at 137; see also Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 16, at 309 ('The
focus of undergraduate legal education is on teaching an abstract body of legal
principles that are not closely tied to the actual cases in which those principles are
applied.").
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lecture style, where the professor expounds and expects students to
absorb and the Socratic method of questioning is rarely utilized.' 0 5
This style of legal education has contributed to the extremely low
passage rate of the Japanese Bar exam. 10 6 Only approximately 2-3%
of candidates pass the annual exam (see Table 1), whereas more than
l0 7
60% of the candidates usually pass the New York State bar exam.
Successful applicants have taken the Japanese Bar exam, which is
Most
held only once a year, an average of five times.' 0 8
undergraduate law students, therefore, have no intention of
competing for the exam, and those who wish to take the exam would
typically undertake studies at cram schools without studying law at a
university. 10 9 A bachelor's of law degree (LL.B.) is not even a
prerequisite to take the exam. 1 10 Although most competitors fail to
pass the exam, it is not considered as a lack of competence."' Those
who fail to pass the exam several times or have no intention of
competing would typically find positions as non-bengoshi in-house
12
lawyers in the legal departments of major Japanese corporations."

105.

GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 136.

See Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 16, at 308 ("Because most students
106.
do not become lawyers and do not expect to become lawyers, they do not pursue
practical training in lawyering, legal research and reasoning and clinical legal
education.").
107.

See Andrew Tilghman, Overseas Lawyers Add Pressureto Bar Exam, TIMES

UNION (N.Y.), Nov. 23, 2002, at Al ('The summer exam's overall pass rate was 67.5
percent, a 5 percent drop from last July's rate of 72.5 percent.").
Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 16, at 310.
108.
GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 136; Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 16, at
109.
310.
Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 16, at 310.
110.
111.

GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 136.

112.

See id. (describing the tendency of Japanese law students).
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Table 1: Bar Passage Rate in Japan
Year

Candidates

Passed

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

25454
27112
30568
33983
36203
38930
45622
50166
49991
45885

734
746
812
1000
994
990
1183
1170
1483
1464
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13

Passage Rate
(%)
2.88
2.75
2.66
2.94
2.75
2.54
2.59
2.33
2.97
3.19

After passing the bar exam, a prospective bengoshi attends Shih6
Kenshfijo (the national Legal Training and Research Institute or
LTRI). 1 4 The LTRI uses both classes and apprenticeships to train
prospective lawyers in the skills of drafting judgments, indictments
and pleadings.'1 5 This training system encompasses the technique of
applying law to facts to decide particular cases; at the end of the oneand-a-half year training period, a prospective bengoshi takes a
practice-oriented examination and, upon passing, finally becomes a
bengoshi. n 6 Upon graduation, new bengoshi choose to be judges,
One could argue that,
prosecutors, or private practitioners.1 1 7
therefore, only those who passed the Japanese Bar exam could learn
the analytical approach equivalent to that taught at U.S. law schools.
E. Legal Education in Japan after 2004: The Birth of
Japanese Law Schools
The year 2004 was the beginning of a new era for Japanese legal
education. In April, 2004, sixty-eight law schools modeled on the U.S.
8
legal education system opened for the first time in Japan's history."
These schools are a key element of a large judicial system reform that

113.
Press Release, The Ministry of Justice of Japan, Shih5 Shiken Dainiji
Shiken Shutsugansha G5kakusha Su Nado No Suii [The Statistics of Bar Pass Rate in
Japan] (Nov. 9, 2005), available at http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/051109-1/174syutu.html.
114.
Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 16, at 309-10.
115.
Id. at 310.
GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 137; Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 16, at
116.
310.
GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 137.
117.
Kingston, supranote 17, at A9.
118.

20071

A TTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE FOR JAPANESE NON-BENGOSHI

is designed not only to increase the number of bengoshi but also to
increase the importance of the rule of law in Japan. 119 The JSRC, an
wrote the reform report, which
independent commission,
encompasses the major changes in the legal education and training
system for both civil and criminal justice. 120 Its recommendations
were quickly and uniformly adopted as Japan's national policy and
121
implemented without political infighting.
The JSRC report proposed an entirely new legal system where
graduate schools, as the core of the system, would provide specialized
practical training for legal professionals. 1 22 The new law schools
123
were placed between undergraduate law faculty and the LTRI.
Admitted students generally would spend three years in the program,
though individual law schools may allow students with a bachelors of
law degree to graduate in two years. 124 The report called for a
passage rate of approximately 70-80% for the new Japanese Bar
exam and provided that those wishing to take the exam must have
graduated from a Japanese law school. 125 However, the numbers of
approved new law schools and admitted students were both greater
than originally expected. 126 As a result, the passage rate under the
new Japanese Bar exam in 2006 was merely 48%.127 Even though
the number is smaller than expected, the increased number of
prospective bengoshi will surely affect the future role of in-house
lawyers in Japan.
F. The Future of In-House Lawyers in Japan
The role of in-house lawyers has become more important due to
128
the expansion of business and the growing need for compliance.
One scholar predicts that in ten years most Japanese companies will
hire bengoshi as general counsel in response to the judicial reform
Although large
and the opening of the new law schools. 129
international or national law firms in metropolitan areas will still be

119.
Maxeiner & Yamanaka, supra note 16, at 310.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 311.
122.
Id. at 311-12. There were graduate law schools even before 2004, but they
have provided legal education only to a small number of students who hoped to become
professors. Id. at 309.
123.
Id. at 312.
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
Id.
126.
127.
New Bar Exam Sees 48% Success Rate, ASAHI.COM, Sept. 23, 2006,
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200609230137.html.
128.
MASAHIRO MURAKAMI, HORITSU-KA NO TAMENO KYARIA RON
PATH FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS] 16 (2005) (Japan).

129.

Id.

[CAREER
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the most popular targets for Japanese law school graduates, those in130
house positions will be the next.
Multinational trading and manufacturing companies, such as
Toyota, Sony, and Panasonic, have already strengthened their
international legal expertise, retaining both Japanese and U.S.licensed in-house lawyers. 13 1 As many companies have entered into
international transactions, they have sent their in-house lawyers to
the United States or England, 132 most likely to pursue an LL.M.
degree and obtain a local license. According to the JSRC, there were
227 foreign licensed in-house lawyers working in Japanese
Thus, in ten years the role of legal
corporations in 2002.133
professionals in Japan will be analogous to that in the United States.
In-house bengoshi will perform various services, including
representation before courts, while Japanese corporations may still
seek specialized services from outside bengoshi.

IV. TRANSNATIONAL APPLICATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

A. The Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege at the InternationalLevel
the attorney-client
Although
most countries recognize
privilege, 134 the scope of the privilege varies. The parameters of the
privilege at the international level mirror the four elements required
135
in the United States.
The main difference in the meaning of "communication" is
136
whether the privilege applies to legal documents held by clients.
Confidential documents in the hands of a lawyer are generally
protected, but documents in the client's possession may not be
protected. 137 For example, in Germany, privilege only attaches to the
lawyer, and any documents in the possession of the corporate clients
Similarly, in Japan documents created by a
can be seized. 138

130.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 134-35.
131.
132.
Id. at 114-15, 137.
133.
JSRC Memorandum, supra note 96.
134.
Joseph Pratt, The Parametersof the Attorney-Client Privilegefor In-House
Counsel at the InternationalLevel: Protectingthe Company's Confidential Information,
20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 145, 161 (1999); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 469
("[Slome form of attorney-client privilege does exist in all the nations of the European
Community.").
135.
See supra text accompanying note 21 (explaining four elements).
136.
For the domestic meaning, see supra text accompanying note 23.
137.
Pratt, supra note 134, at 162.
138.
Josephine Carr, Are Your International Communications Protected?, ACC
DOCKET, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 32, 33.
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139
bengoshi but held by the client do not enjoy the privilege.
In addition, some foreign jurisdictions may extend attorneyclient privilege to communications to the attorney, but not from the
attorney to the client in the civil context. 140 This distinction partially
resembles the strict construction taken by some U.S. courts: they
the
deny the privilege when the legal advice does not encompass
14 1
confidences from the client on which the legal opinion is based.
The basic meaning of "in confidence" in foreign countries appears
similar to that in the United States: 14 2 as a general rule, confidential
communications are limited by necessity. 143 Although most foreign
countries require a certain level of confidentiality, 144 the duty of
confidentiality may differ, especially in the former Communist
countries and China. 145 In China, the government has traditionally
taken a somewhat public approach to private corporate information,
and lawyers in China have been required to place their loyalty to the
146
government above that to their clients.
As to the requirement that the communication be "for the
1
purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client ," 47
most foreign countries, like the United States, consider whether a
particular communication between an attorney and a client relates to
legal advice before honoring the privilege. 148 Therefore, one should
expect that the more a communication digresses from legal advice,
149
the less privilege it will likely enjoy.
The most controversial issue in attorney-client privilege at the
international level would probably be the meaning of "privileged

139.

Jason Marin, Note, Invoking the US Attorney-Client Privilege: Japanese

Corporate Quasi-Lawyers Deserve Protection in U.S. Courts Too, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.

1558, 1568 (1998). But see Eisai Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 341,
344 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[I]t is clear from the plain meaning of the Japanese statute that
any holder of privileged documents-including clients as well as benrishi-ispermitted
to withhold them.").
140.

EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 470.

141.
Id.; see, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156,
163 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The privilege has been upheld for documents sent by house
counsel where the documents reveal client confidences or provide legal assistance.").
For the domestic meaning, see supra text accompanying note 25.
142.
143.
Pratt, supra note 134, at 162-63
144.
Id. at 162; see, e.g., John Boyd, A.M. & S. and the In-House Lawyer, 7 EUR.
L.R. 493, 494 (1982) ("The advice of the EEC-qualified lawyer may be circulated or
copied within the client company, but presumably not to such an extent as would
prejudice its confidentiality.").
145.
Pratt, supra note 134, at 162.
Id. at 162-163; see also Timothy A. Gelatt, Lawyers in China: The Past
146.
Decade and Beyond, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 751, 756, 791-92 (1991) (describing

Chinese lawyers as supporters of socialist system, rather than individual
professionals).
147.
For the domestic meaning, see supra text accompanying note 26.
Pratt, supra note 134, at 168.
148.
149.

Id.
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persons,"150 which is the central issue of this Note. Countries take
one of three approaches to whether in-house lawyers constitute
privileged persons. 151 First, in countries such as the United States
and England, in-house lawyers are generally considered privileged
persons. 152 In England, for example, privilege is recognized if inhouse lawyers belong to the bar and operate under the same ethical
obligations as outside lawyers. 153 Countries in the second group,
such as Austria, do not regard in-house lawyers as privileged persons,
because they consider in-house lawyers to be distinct from private
practitioners and believe that in-house lawyers are too dependent on
154
their corporate client to exercise independent objective judgment.
Third, some countries require in-house lawyers to meet certain
standards to qualify as privileged persons. 155 For example, Germany
requires the maintenance of a separate office and that the action be
undertaken in a capacity as an attorney.156
B. Extension of the Attorney-Client Privilege at the InternationalLevel
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided how the
attorney-client privilege applies to litigants from other countries,
lower courts generally have agreed that the privilege is applicable to
foreign lawyers who are admitted to practice locally. 157 Some
authorities place the protection of confidentiality over the principle of
disclosure and do not require bar membership. The Supreme Court
Advisory Committee, for example, broadly defined a lawyer for
purposes of the attorney-client privilege as "a person authorized, or
reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to practice law in
any state or nation.' 158 Wigmore also proposed that a "professional

150.
For the domestic meaning, see supra text accompanying note 24.
151.
Pratt, supra note 134, at 164.
152.
For the explanation of privilege in the United States, see supra Part II.D
(explaining that the privilege generally applies to communications between a
corporation and its in-house lawyer in the United States).
153.
Pratt, supra note 134, at 164.
154.
Id. at 165.
155.
Id. at 167.
156.
Id.
157.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 cmt. e
(2000) ("Mhe privilege applies to communications to a person whom the client
reasonably believes to be a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer admitted to practice in another
jurisdiction or a lawyer admitted to practice in a foreign nation is a lawyer for the
purposes of the privilege.'); see also Ga.-Pac. Plywood Co. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 18
F.R.D. 463, 465-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that an in-house lawyer who was
employed in New York but licensed only in the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania
had the privilege in New York).
158.
Proposed FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(2), reprinted in CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEE
NOTES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 300 (1995)

[hereinafter Proposed FRE 503(a)(2)]

(emphasis added); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 950 (West 2006) ( '[L]awyer' means a
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privilege" be recognized for non-lawyer specialists, because people
59
who seek their advice would be in the same position as clients. 1
Beyond agency doctrine, however, federal courts have rarely
extended attorney-client privilege to legal professionals other than
lawyers. 160 The issue is most frequently litigated in connection with
patent lawyers and agents, 161 and U.S. federal courts have taken
three approaches: (1) the touch base approach; (2) the bright line
approach; and (3) the functional approach. In addition, two other
approaches recently have been proposed by practitioners: the
modified functional approach and the uniform federal common law
approach.
The touch base approach emphasizes international comity. A
majority of U.S. federal courts have turned to a conflict of laws
approach in deciding whether to recognize a privilege in the
international context. 162
The touch base approach can be
summarized as follows: "[C]ommunications with foreign patent
agents regarding assistance in prosecuting foreign patent
applications may be privileged if the privilege would apply under the
law of the foreign country in which the patent application is filed and
163
that law is not contrary to the public policy of the United States."
In Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., the court applied
international principles of comity in analyzing communications with
British and French patent agents over which the patent-holder
asserted the attorney-client privilege, 164 The court held that the
comity-based application of foreign privilege laws protected
communications with foreign patent agents that did not "touch base"
with the United States. 165 Then, the court In re Ampicillin Antitrust
Litigation applied Duplan's touch base analysis but reached the
opposite holding, recognizing the privilege for a British patent
agent. 166 This court held that availability of the attorney-client
privilege was governed by the law of the country to which the patent
activities related, but communications relating to patent activities in

person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to practice law
in any state or nation.").
159. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2300a ("[Tlhe specialists, as the client's agent,
has a natural and a responsible part in presenting the client's case. The client must
confide in the agent precisely as he does in the attorney. There is every reason ... for
recognizing a privilege for those confidences.").
160. Yoshida, supra note 83, at 217.
161.
EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 472-73.
162. See Virginia J. Harnisch, Confidential Communications Between Clients
and Patent Agents: Are They Protected Under the Attorney-Client Privilege?, 16
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 433, 445-46 (1994) (discussing the traditional analysis of
the privilege for foreign patent agents).
163. Willi, supra note 34, at 322.
164.

397 F. Supp. 1146, 1169 (D.S.C. 1974)

165.
166.

Id. at 1169-70.
81 F.R.D. 377, 391 (D.D.C. 1978).
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the United States were protected by the privilege only if the agent
was registered with the U.S. Patent Office. 167 Thus, whether the
foreign communications touch base with the United States would be
outcome determinative.
Under this approach, regardless of whether a Japanese
corporation touches the United States or a U.S. corporation touches
Japan,
the
attorney-client
privilege
would
not
protect
communications with non-bengoshi in-house lawyers who are not
licensed in the United States 168 or admitted to practice under
Japanese law. 169
U.S. licensed, non-bengoshi in-house lawyers,
however, would likely be able to assert privilege if a Japanese
corporation's activities touches the United States.
By contrast, some courts rejected the comity approach in favor of
a more formalistic approach. The court in Status Time Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp. articulated a bright line rule: the foreign patent
agents were not members of the U.S. bar and thus not attorneys for
the purpose of the privilege. 1 70 Under this rule, foreign patent
lawyers are not allowed to assert the attorney-client privilege
regardless of the local privilege law.171 The court reasoned that the
necessity for unrestricted confidence did not exist between the client
and its patent agent, and the expansion of the privilege would be
1 72
"beyond its proper bounds."'
Status Time strongly influenced decisions in the period
immediately following its issuance, as judges lauded Status Time as a
"singularly erudite opinion"'173 and a "seminal decision.'' 174 Similarly,
in Duttle v. Bandler & Kass, the court applied the bright line rule to
reject an assertion of the privilege covering German tax advisors and
75
notaries. 1
In Novamont, the magistrate judge distinguished the Duplan
opinion and its progeny by claiming that "where there are United
States interests in issue relating to a United States patent, it is our
federal common law of privilege which governs" and expansion of the
privilege would "frustrate . . . the truth-seeking process."'176 Under

167.
Id.
168.
Some Japanese corporations, however, retain foreign licensed in-house
lawyers and those numbers are expected to increase. See supra text accompanying
notes 132-33 (discussing foreign licensed in-house lawyers).
169.
See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (explaining the attorneyclient privilege under the new CCP does not cover non-bengoshi in-house lawyer).
170.
95 F.R.D. 27, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Revlon, Inc. v. Carson Prods. Co., No. 82 Civ. 4326 (EW), 1983 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15426, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1983).
174.
Novamont N. Am. Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., No. 91 Civ. 6482 (DNE),
1992 WL 114507, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1992).
175.
127 F.R.D. 46, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
176.
1992 WL 114507, at *2.
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the bright line approach, there is no room for the application of
attorney-client privilege to Japanese non-bengoshi in-house lawyers
unless they are members of the U.S. bar.
As touch base became the prevailing approach, 177 courts taking
the bright line approach were concerned that recognizing an
expansion of privilege would "frustrate . . . the truth-seeking
process.' 178 As the Supreme Court reasoned in Upjohn, however, the
purpose of attorney-client privilege is to "promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.' 179 A
third approach tries to promote the observance of law and
administration of justice without frustrating the truth-seeking
process.
In Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v.Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.,
the court applied the functional approach to protect communications
between a corporation and its German in-house patent advisors.' 8 0
The court reasoned that the German in-house patent advisors were
engaged in "the substantive lawyering process,"'' 1 thus applying a
functional analysis to determine whether privilege existed. This
approach would provide a certain level of predictability, because the
analysis is based on the nature of the communication rather than the
court's interpretation of foreign law. Under the functional approach,
the attorney-client privilege would likely be extended to Japanese
non-bengoshi in-house lawyers, because they are engaged in "the
18 2
substantive lawyering process.'
To prevent the broad expansion of the privilege, a modification of
the functional approach was proposed. For example, Yoshida asserts
that the functional approach may overly expand the boundaries of the
privilege, but the risk may be reduced by additional requirements to
8 3
ensure that the communication was made to a legal professional.1
l8 4
According to Wigmore, the
Yoshida finds support in Wigmore.
proper test for recognizing the privilege is whether the profession
"requires an oath of office and prior proof of professional
qualifications and maintains a list of registered persons so qualified,
or if in any other way its regulations treat the special practitioners as

See Yoshida, supra note 83, at 240 n. 222 ("A survey of reported cases
177.
indicates that a majority of cases have applied a comity analysis .....
178.
1992 WL 114507, at *2.
179. 449 U.S. at 389.
Dec. 18,
180. No. 95 C 0673, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19274, at *25-*28 (N.D. Ill.
1996).
181.
Id. at *27-*28.
182. See supra Part III.C (explaining the role of non-bengoshi in-house lawyers
in Japan).
183. Yoshida, supra note 83, at 245.
184. See id.
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a licensed body having the responsibility of attorneys and subject to
professional discipline."'18 5
The modified functional approach extends the attorney-client
privilege to foreign legal professionals who provide important
advisory services within their own systems.1 86 Yoshida argues that
much of the current U.S. law tends to limit the protection of the
attorney-client privilege to U.S. lawyers, thereby casting a shadow
over the principle of the privilege, and this approach represents a
solution that gives due deference to international legal
87
communities.1
Japanese patent lawyers would be able to assert the attorneyclient privilege under the modified functional approach.
As to
Japanese non-bengoshi in-house lawyers, however, the result would
not necessarily be the same, because they are neither required to take
an oath of office, have prior proof of professional qualifications, be
registered nor are they subject to professional discipline.
All of the various approaches above focus on whether or how the
attorney-client privilege should be extended in the international
context. One practitioner, however, proposes a uniform approach,
which covers both U.S. and foreign patent practitioners at the same
time. Willi proposes, "The [uniform] federal common law of attorneyclient privilege applies regardless of whether the client is foreign or
domestic, whether the patent practitioner is foreign or domestic, and
whether the patent is foreign or domestic."' 8 8 Willi asserts that, first,
the Federal Circuit should adopt the broad definition under proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence1 8 9 so that lawyer includes "a person
authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to
practice law in any state or nation."' 9 0 Then, the Federal Circuit
should eliminate the common law requirement that legal advisors be
members of a bar. 19 1 Finally, in light of Sperry v. Florida,19 2 the
Federal Circuit should clarify that both U.S. and foreign patent
agents are authorized to practice patent law, and thus, they are both
193
lawyers for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.

185.
186.

WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2300a.
Yoshida, supra note 83, at 247.

187.

Id.

188.
Willi, supra note 34, at 283.
189.
Proposed FRE 503(a)( 2 ), supra note 158.
190.
Willi, supra note 34, at 348.
191.
Id.
192.
373 U.S. 379, 384-88 (1963) (holding that in light of federal law authorizing
patent agents to practice before the USPTO and to perform "services which are
reasonably necessary and incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent
applications[,]" states were prohibited from restricting such conduct even if it
constituted the practice of law).
193.
Willi, supra note 34, at 348.
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Willi claims that the adoption of such a uniform federal common
law would result in greater predictability, fewer disputes, and
conservation of client and judicial resources. 194 If U.S. courts were to
apply this to Japanese non-bengoshi in-house lawyers, the critical
issue would be whether they were reasonably believed by the client to
195
be authorized to practice law.
C. The Eisai Decision
A recent federal court decision in December 2005, however,
196
reaffirmed the comity approach taken by Duplan and its progeny.
In Eisai Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Inc., the court held that
documents reflecting legal advice provided by Japanese benrishi were
protected by the attorney-client privilege. 197 The court reasoned that,
as a matter of comity, the court should look to Japanese law, subject
to overriding U.S. policy concerns. 198 Although the U.S. defendant
argued that comity did not require recognition of a Japanese privilege
different from the U.S. privilege, the court rejected this argument. 199
The court held that total congruence between U.S. and Japanese law
was not required to extend comity and that the benrishi privilege was
"comparable" to the U.S. attorney-client privilege. 200
The court observed that "the unanimous weight of authority
relating to Japanese benrishi subsequent to the 1998 amendment of
the Code of Civil Procedure of Japan" extended the privilege to
documents created by benrishi.20 1 As to the 1998 amendment, the
court noted that, although there was little need for the privilege
before 1998 because there was no civil provision for document
discovery, the Japanese legislature adopted the privilege in
connection with liberal discovery procedures introduced by a broader
reform in 1998.202 Thus, the functional equivalency argument for

194.
Id. at 349.
195.
See infra notes 268-72 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonable
expectation of the client).
196.
See supra Part IV.B (discussing Duplan's "touch base" approach).
197.
406 F. Supp. 2d 341, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
198.

Id.

199.
Id. at 343-44.
200.
Id.
201.
Id. at 343 & n.2; see Murata Mfg. Co. v. Bel Fuse Inc., No. 03 C 2934, 2005
WL 281217, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2005) (holding that Japanese law accorded
privilege to benrishi-clientcommunications); Knoll Pharms. Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc., No. 01 C 1646, 2004 WL 2966964, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2004) ("Under Japanese
law, documents reflecting communications between patent agents and clients are
exempt from production."); VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 17 (D. Mass.
2000) ("Japanese law would treat the [letter to benrishi] as privileged."); see also supra
Part III.B (discussing the attorney-client privilege in Japan).
202.
Eisai, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 345.

528

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

/VOL. 40..503

benrishi-client communications is no longer necessary under Eisai
reasoning.

V. APPLICATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO JAPANESE
NON-BENGOSHI IN-HOUSE LAWYERS

Even though the Eisai decision makes the functional equivalency
argument to recognize the attorney-client privilege for benrishi
unnecessary, the argument is still necessary for asserting attorneyclient privilege for non-bengoshi in-house lawyers, because there is no
to non-bengoshi in-house lawyers under current
privilege applicable
20 3
Japanese law.
A. Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Japanese Corporations
In U.S. federal courts, the FRCP generally govern pre-trial
written
discovery;
the
rules include
document
requests,
interrogatories, permission to enter land for inspection, physical and
mental examination, requests for admission, and the taking of
depositions. 20 4 Discovery from non-U.S. defendants is either taken
according to the FRCP or the Hague Evidence Convention. 20 5 Japan,
however, is not a signatory to the Convention. 20 6 In such a case, the
U.S. court will therefore first consider whether there is in fact any
conflict between the discovery rules of Japan and the United States,
and second, if there is a conflict, the court will analyze the principles
of comity to determine whether these principles require use of
20 7
Japanese laws in the case.
If U.S. courts look to Japanese law under the Eisai reasoning,2 08
the privilege would unlikely apply to non-bengoshi in-house lawyers.
The new CCP allows withholding documents if they contain
information the holder received in the line of duty as a professional;
bengoshi and benrishi are included in the definition of a

203.
See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (explaining the attorneyclient privilege under the new CCP does not cover non-bengoshi in-house lawyer).
204.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
205.
Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S.
522, 541 (1987).
206.
In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp 2d 45, 55 (D.D.C. 2000)
("Japan did not join the Hague Convention apparently out of fear of American-type
discovery procedures .... ").
207.
Id. The Vitamins court, however, applied the FRCP because concerns for
the principles of comity and Japan's sovereign interests in protecting its citizens from
unduly burdensome discovery did not outweigh the need for prompt and efficient
resolution of the case; U.S. plaintiffs would not likely be able to obtain the necessary
pretrial testimony and documentary evidence under the Japanese Law. Id. at 55-56.
208.
See supra Part IV.C (analyzing the Eisai comity approach).
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professional. 20 9 There is, however, no professional duty applicable to
210
non-bengoshi in-house lawyers under current Japanese law.
Japanese corporations, therefore, should look to an alternative
argument to protect confidential communications with their nonbengoshi in-house lawyers.
B. Remy Martin or Minolta?
The analysis of the following two U.S. federal court opinions
significantly helps in finding alternative arguments for the attorney
client privilege.
The court in Remy Martin used a functional approach to find the
attorney-client privilege applied to communications between a French
corporation and its in-house lawyers who were not members of a
bar.2 11 This case seems to be most supportive of the recognition of
the privilege for non-bengoshi.212 Assuming, for purposes of the
motion before it, that French law would not grant a privilege, the
court analyzed whether U.S. law provided the privilege. 2 13 The court
noted the difference in the legal profession between France and the
214
United States as follows.
In France, there is a two-tiered system where each category of
legal professional performs a different function, all of which would be
performed by a lawyer in the United States. The avocat provides
legal services to clients and represents them in court, but may not be
employed by other persons or organizations, and the conseil juridique
provides legal services to clients, too, but may not represent them in
court and may only be employed by other conseil juridique.215 Inhouse lawyers are prohibited by law from being on the list of avocat
or conseil juridique, though they are allowed to give legal advice to
216
corporations.
The court reasoned that, because there is no clear French
equivalent to U.S. bar membership, the relevant question was not
whether French in-house lawyers were members of a bar, but
whether the individual was permitted by law to render legal advice
and competent to do so. To be eligible for the attorney-client
privilege, an individual must perform similar functions to U.S.
lawyers. 2 17
The French in-house lawyers, like their U.S.

209.
See supra Part III.B (discussing the attorney-client privilege in Japan).
210.
See id. For the discussion under the old CCP, see supra text accompanying
notes 84-85.
211.
Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Del. 1982).
212.
Marin, supra note 139, at 1588.
213.
Remy Martin, 98 F.R.D. at 444.
214.
Id.
215.
Id.
216.
Id.
217.
Id.
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counterparts, have legal training and are employed by corporations to
give advice on legally significant corporate matters; French law
allows them to do so. 2 18 The French in-house lawyers are, therefore,
the functional equivalent of U.S. in-house lawyers.
By contrast, another court reached a different conclusion,
applying a similar functional equivalence test to a Japanese in-house
patent advisor.2 19 Honeywell, Inc. v. Minolta Camera Co. involves a
patent infringement issue where Minolta, a Japanese film
manufacturing company, asserted the attorney-client privilege
regarding the communications with its employee, who was not
admitted to the bar of Japan or any other country and was not a
registered patent agent of Japan or any other country. 22 0 The court
held that the Magistrate's factual determination that the employee
was the functional equivalent of an attorney was "clearly
erroneous."2 2 1 The court observed that Remy Martin was not
controlling, because it discussed only the factual circumstances of the
22 2
case before it and cited no authority for expansion of the privilege.
The court, however, considered various facts to determine
whether the employee was the functional equivalent of a U.S. lawyer
(i.e., a "de facto attorney"). 223 The court reasoned that the following
were insufficient factual support for the finding of functional
equivalency: (1) the employee had never been licensed to practice law
and never been registered as a patent agent in the United States or in
Japan; (2) he had only a Bachelor's of Science degree; and (3) he had
never received formal training except for attending various seminars,
22 4
lectures, and classes regarding legal and patent issues.
As to international comity, the court noted that there was no
need to look to Japanese law, because no sovereign interest of Japan
was implicated: depositions had been conducted in Japan merely as a
courtesy to Minolta. 2 25 Although the court denied application of the
privilege to the non-benrishi in-house patent advisor, the court did
not answer whether Japanese non-bengoshi in-house lawyers were
226
the functional equivalent of U.S. lawyers.

218.
Id. The court also noted that the communications were clearly intended
and reasonably expected to be in confidence. Id.
219.
Marin, supra note 139, at 1590, asserts that the Minolta court rejected the
application of the functional equivalence test. However, as this part explains, the
Minolta court applied a test very similar to the functional equivalence test; the court
simply reached the opposite conclusion.
220.
No. 87-4847, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5954, at *1-*2 (D.N.J. May 15, 1990).
221.
Id. at "9-*10.
222.
Id. at *6-*7.
223.
Id. at *6, *9.
224.
Id. at *9.
225.
Id. at *10 n.2.
226.
See id. at *9-*10.
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C. Arguments For the Attorney-Client Privilege
The most common arguments for the application of the attorneyclient privilege to Japanese non-bengoshi in-house lawyers are
fairness and predictability, functional equivalency, and reasonable
reliance.
One could argue that, because the attorney-client privilege
protects communications between a U.S. corporation and U.S.
licensed in-house lawyers, unequal treatment would arise between
U.S. corporations and Japanese corporations, which generally do not
retain bengoshi in-house lawyers. 227 In other words, if a U.S.
corporation invokes the attorney-client privilege, it should be
estopped from denying its opponent Japanese corporation the same
protection. 228
The uniform application of the attorney-client
privilege, regardless of whether the in-house lawyers are foreign or
domestic, would lead to less arbitrary and artificial treatment and
2 29
thus greater predictability.
Under the functional equivalence test of Remy Martin and
Minolta,23 0 Japanese non-bengoshi in-house lawyers could be treated
as the functional equivalent of U.S. lawyers. 23 1 The test recognizes
that "one can receive the equivalent of U.S. legal education without
attending the equivalent of a U.S. law school," and that the amount of
legal advice that in-house lawyers provide for a corporation, which
employs them specifically for the purpose of seeking legal advice, is
equivalent to that given by U.S. lawyers.23 2 Under this approach the
most important criterion is not a bar membership but rather the legal
233
function of the job.

227.
FUJITA, supra note 85, at 274.
228.
Marin, supra note 139, at 1592.
229.
See Pratt, supra note 134, at 168-69. ("[D]ifferent applications of the
privilege [at the international level] can lead to disastrous consequences for in-house
counsel and the corporations they advise."); Willi, supra note 34, at 283 (proposing a
uniform approach to the applicability of the privilege in U.S. patent litigation, "so that
the same federal common law of attorney-client privilege applies regardless of whether
the client is foreign or domestic [and] whether the . . . practitioner is foreign or
domestic"); Yoshida, supra note 83, at 246 ("If the attorney-client privilege can be
expanded to cover U.S. patent agents ... the denial of protection to patent advisers in
foreign systems.., is artificial and arbitrary.").
230.
See supra Part V.B (explaining the functional equivalence test).
231.
See Marin, supra note 139, at 1602 ("[The distinctions between in-house
legal personnel and [bengoshi in-house lawyers are] very similar to the distinctions
between French in-house counsel and independent lawyers discussed in Remy
Martin.").
232.
Id.
233.
See id. ("Courts will be ignoring the requirement of bar membership, in
favor of the requirement that the advice rendered be legal in nature."). Some U.S.
courts think a local bar membership is not material. See, e.g., Ga.-Pac.Plywood Co., 18
F.R.D.at 464-66 (holding that an in-house lawyer who was employed in New York but
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One practitioner argues that the attorney-client privilege would
not apply to all non-bengoshi in-house lawyers but only to high
ranking in-house lawyers.2 34 Fujita notes that, in Upjohn, the issue
involved communications between the corporate client and the chief
general counsel who had worked in-house for twenty years. 23 5 A U.S.
court, therefore, would likely find that a manager of a legal
department, who is responsible for and participates actively in all
legal matters within a corporation, is the functional equivalent of the
chief general counsel in Upjohn.23 6 The qualifications of those high
ranking in-house lawyers are also supported by the fact that many
legal texts and materials are written by non-bengoshi experts, who
23 7
also teach a majority of practical courses.
Although non-bengoshi may not be experts on Japanese law, they
have either studied U.S. law or worked in conjunction with U.S.
lawyers; thus, their advice has enabled Japanese corporations to
comply with U.S. law. 238 It is, therefore, asserted that the extension
of the privilege only to bengoshi would result in non-bengoshi inhouse lawyers giving flawed advice on U.S. law to Japanese
23 9
corporations.
Even if the attorney-client privilege does not apply to nonbengoshi in their own capacity, there is an alternative argument for
the privilege. U.S. courts have recognized the extension of the
240
privilege to agents and subordinates working under a lawyer.
Even if the Japanese non-bengoshi in-house lawyers are not experts
on U.S. law, they could be acting as an agent of a U.S. lawyer
241
providing legal advice to the corporation.
D. Against the Attorney-Client Privilege
Among the arguments against application of the attorney-client
privilege for Japanese non-bengoshi in-house lawyers are strict
interpretation, lack of reasonable expectation of confidentiality, and

licensed only in the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania had the privilege in New
York).
234.
FUJITA, supra note 85, at 277.
235.
Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 48-52 (explaining Upjohn holding
and reasoning); see also Ga.-Pac. Plywood, 18 F.R.D. at 464-66 (applying the privilege
to in-house counsel who was "Director, Legal and Patent Department").
236.
FUJITA, supra note 85, at 277.
237.
Id. at 279-80.
238.
Marin, supra note 139, at 1603.
239.
Id.
240.
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (explaining the privilege
under the agency theory).
241.
Marin, supra note 139, at 1603.
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non-equivalency of Japanese legal education to U.S. legal
2 42
education.
The formalist approach would deny the attorney-client privilege
to a communication with one who is not a member of a bar. As
Wigmore noted, because the attorney-client privilege may obstruct
the administration of justice, the privilege "should be recognized only
within the narrowest limits required by principle," and "[t]he
investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial duty
2' 43
demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges.
To be in confidence, "at the time and in the circumstances of the
communication, the communicating person reasonably believes that
no one will learn the contents of the communication except a
privileged person ...or another person within whom communications
are protected under a similar privilege. '244 Thus, one could argue
that it would not be reasonable for Japanese corporations to expect
confidentiality from Japanese non-bengoshi in-house lawyers who are
not explicitly extended the confidentiality privilege under Japanese
24 5
law.
Even under the functional equivalence test, 246 one could argue
that Japanese non-benghosi in-house lawyers are different from U.S.
lawyers in many aspects. For example, legal education in Japan and
the United States used to be fundamentally different. 24 7 Most inhouse lawyers in Japan did not pass the bar exam, and they did not
248
get analytical training taught at the LTRI and U.S. law schools.
One Japanese scholar even comments that "American law school
graduates, who receive a higher education than Japanese law
department graduates, should enjoy higher social status than their
Japanese counterparts. 2 49 In addition, while the privilege applies
only to the legal advice and not to purely business advice, 250 in the
case of non-bengoshi in-house lawyers, it might be difficult to
differentiate legal advice and non-legal advice.

242.
There is also an argument that in-house lawyer may be overly influenced
by their employers, thus lacking independence. See Hill, supra note 27, at 183-85
(questioning the validity of this argument).
243.
WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2192(3).
For cases that applied this strict
approach, see supra text accompanying note 33.
244.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF THE LAW GOVERNING

LAWYERS

§71

(2000)

(emphasis added); see also supra Part IV.B (explaining the uniform common law
approach based on reasonable reliance of the client).
245.
See Marin, supra note 139, at 1599-1600 (describing the argument about
the lack of reasonable expectation); see also supra Part III.B (discussing the attorneyclient privilege under the Japanese law).
246.
See supra Part V.B (explaining the functional equivalence test).
247.
See supra Part III.D (discussing Japanese legal education before 2004).
248.
See id.
249.
Masanobu Kato, The Role of Law and Lawyers in Japan and the United
States, 1987 BYU L. Rev. 627, 630.
250.
See supra text accompanying notes 54-59 (explaining the distinction).
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. How Would U.S Courts Likely Approach?
Under the recent Eisai comity approach, a U.S. court would first
decide whether international comity requires the court to look to
Japanese law. 251 If the court looked into Japanese law, the court
would find that there is no attorney-client privilege applicable to
Japanese non-bengoshi in-house lawyers. 252 The court, however,
would not apply comity, because unlike the case of benrishi, no
sovereign interest of Japan is implicated where Japanese
corporations may not protect communications with non-bengoshi inhouse lawyers under the Japanese law. 253 The court would then
decide whether the attorney-client privilege applies to non-bengoshi
254
in-house lawyers under U.S. law.
The functional equivalence argument would provide a test to
implement fairness, but it does come with a risk of going beyond the
boundaries of privilege. 25 5 The test, therefore, should be whether an
individual is competent to render legal advice and perform similar
functions to the U.S. lawyers in terms of education, training, activity,
and reasonable expectation of the client; although Remy Martin and
Minolta reached the opposite conclusions, both cases applied this test
to non-bar in-house lawyers. 256 This test is different from the
modified functional equivalence test proposed by Yoshida, 257 because
this test provides clear criteria (i.e., education, activity, and
reasonable expectation of the client) based on two U.S. federal cases.
This test may be called the Remy-Martin/Minolta test. This solution
would encourage effective representation through truthful disclosure
by corporate clients to their in-house lawyers, thus serving the very
258
policies underlying the privilege.

251.
See supra Part IV.C (explaining Eisai'sholding and reasoning).
252.
See supra Part III.B (discussing the attorney-client privilege in Japan).
253.
Cf. Honeywell, Inc. v. Minolta Camera Co., No. 87-4847, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5954, at *10 n.2 (D.N.J. May 15, 1990) (holding that there is no need for looking
to Japanese law because no sovereign interest of Japan is implicated where depositions
has'been conducted in Japan merely as a courtesy to Japanese corporation).
254.
See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text (explaining applicable rule
to a non-signatory of the Hague Evidence Convention).
255.
See supra Part IV.B (discussing the modified functional approach).
256.
See supra Part V.B (comparing Remy Martin and Minolta).
257.
See supra Part IV.B (discussing the modified functional approach).
258.
See Yoshida, supra note 83, at 247 (asserting that the application of the
attorney-client privilege to foreign legal advisors under the functional equivalency test
would encourage effective representation and serve the goal of the privilege); see also
Marin, supra note 139, at 1605 (claiming that the application of the privilege to all
Japanese in-house lawyers serves the purpose of the privilege and the very nature of
U.S. judicial system). Among the arguments for the attorney-client privilege, the
fairness concern might not be very persuasive because the most salient criteria in
evaluating a procedural rule is whether and how the rule works, not whether the rule
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B. Application of the Remy-Martin!Minolta Test
Under the Remy-Martin/Minolta test, however, most of the nonbengoshi in-house lawyers would likely be denied attorney-client
privilege. First, Remy Martin would not necessarily control the issue
here, because while in-house lawyers are forbidden from the bar in
France,2 59 Japanese law does not prohibit companies from retaining
bengoshi in-house lawyers to obtain legal advice for their own
corporate matters with prior approval from the Japanese Bar
is promoted
The lack of bar membership
Association. 260
261
predominantly by the corporations themselves.
Second, the Japanese undergraduate law program is not
equivalent to the J.D. program in the United States; the focus of the
Japanese legal education is fundamentally different from that of U.S.
legal education. 262 Before 2004, only those who passed the bar exam
were allowed to attend the LTRI to learn the analytical approach
taught at U.S. law schools. 263 That Japanese law schools are modeled
on the U.S. J.D. program would support the non-equivalency
Students who become in-house lawyers without
position. 264
attending the LTRI may not have learned how to apply lawyers'
In Minolta, the court
critical skills in a sophisticated way. 265
had
only a Bachelor's of
advisor
patent
emphasized that the in-house
Science degree and had never received formal training, except for
attending various seminars, lectures, and classes concerning legal
and patent issues. 266 This is true for most of the non-bengoshi inhouse lawyers, too, except that they generally have a Bachelor's of
26 7
Law degree.
Third, Japanese corporations would not reasonably expect
communications with most of the non-bengoshi in-house lawyers to be
Japanese law does not list non-bengoshi in-house
confidential.
268
lawyers as part of a class that should receive any sort of privilege.
Some in-house lawyers do not perform similar functions to U.S.

applies fairly and equally. See Maurice Rosenberg, FederalRules of Civil Procedurein
Action: Asserting Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2200-01 (1989) (discussing
how to evaluate a procedural rule).
See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (explaining French legal
259.
system).
See supra Part III.C (discussing traditional in-house lawyers in Japan).
260.
261.
See id.
See supra Part III.D (discussing Japanese legal education before 2004).
262.
See id.
263.
See supra Part III.E (discussing Japanese legal education after 2004).
264.
Miller, supranote 10, at 37.
265.
See supra text accompanying notes 223-24 (explaining Minolta's
266.
reasoning).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12 (describing typical in-house
lawyers in Japan).
268. See supra Part III.B (discussing the attorney-client privilege in Japan).
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lawyers because they rotate among various divisions, such as sales
and public relations, as "generalists. ' 26 9 Expansion of the attorneyclient privilege to such in-house lawyers "would frustrate important
principles of our jurisprudence which disfavor testamentary
exclusionary principles . . . because they inhibit the truth-seeking
process." 2 70
In practice, Japanese corporations generally retain
outside lawyers in complex matters that may potentially lead to
27 1
litigation.
In addition, the fact that many companies have sent their inhouse lawyers to the United States or England to obtain a local
license 272 shows corporate expectation for and reliance on the
expertise of those foreign licensed lawyers. Thus, compliance with
U.S. law would be encouraged not by asserting the application of the
privilege to non-bengoshi in-house lawyers,27 3 but by requiring U.S.
bar membership for Japanese lawyers.
By contrast, a U.S. court would likely find a manager of a legal
department, who is responsible for and participates actively in all
legal matters within a corporation, to be the functional equivalent of
a U.S. in-house lawyer. Such a manager performs legal functions
sufficiently analogous to the general counsel in Upjohn, considering
his education, training, activity, and the client's reasonable
expectations. 274 This test would generate more predictability, thus
encouraging corporations to obtain legal advice and better compliance
with the law.
C. How Can Japanese CorporationsProtect Confidential Information?
The attorney-client privilege, therefore, would not apply to most
of the non-bengoshi lawyers working in Japanese corporations. At
most, it would likely be applicable only to a manager of a legal
department. The situation, however, will change in the near future
when Japanese corporations start retaining bengoshi, who have
2 75
graduated from new Japanese law schools, as in-house lawyers.
Meanwhile, Japanese corporations can protect themselves in the
following ways: (1) using either U.S.-licensed lawyers or Japanese
bengoshi as in-house lawyers; (2) involving a manager of the legal

269.
MURAKAMI, supra note 128, at 139.
270.
Novamont N. Am. Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., No. 91 Civ. 6482 (DNE),
1992 WL 114507, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1992).
271.
MURAKAMI, supra note 128, at 135.
272.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-33 (discussing Japanese
corporations retaining foreign licensed in-house lawyers).
273.
See supra text accompanying notes 238-39 (explaining the argument in
connection with the encouragement of compliance with the U.S. law).
274.
See supra text accompanying notes 234-37 (describing Fujita's argument
for the application of the privilege to a certain level of in-house managers).
275.
See supra Part III.F (discussing the future of in-house lawyers in Japan).
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department in all confidential communications; (3) using in-house
lawyers acting as agents of bengoshi attorneys; and (4) using Upjohn
memorandum.
First, communications with U.S.-licensed in-house lawyers and
those with bengoshi in-house lawyers will be protected under the
attorney-client privilege, as would those between U.S. corporations
and their in-house lawyers. 2 76 Japanese corporations, therefore, can
retain bengoshi or U.S. licensed lawyers; alternatively, they can send
they
their non-bengoshi in-house lawyers to U.S. law schools so that
2 77
can learn the analytical skills and obtain U.S. bar membership.
Second, all important corporate documents and questions from
the board of directors should be handled by the manager of the legal
department. 278 For example, in complex matters involving
subsidiaries that may potentially lead to litigation, all correspondence
should be delivered to and from the manger. 279 Japanese
corporations, however, should note that all communications must be
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, because attempts to use
bengoshi, U.S. licensed lawyers, or legal department managers as a
shield to hide embarrassing information would be sanctioned by U.S.
courts. 28 0 A manager of a legal department, therefore, may not
require all documents to be directed to her attention where legal
advice was not expressly sought.
Third, even if the Japanese in-house lawyers themselves are not
experts on U.S. law, Japanese corporations could argue that they act
as agents of the outside U.S. lawyers. 28 1 In complex U.S.-Japan
transactions, particularly those that may potentially lead to
litigation, Japanese corporations should retain outside U.S. lawyers
who directly communicate with non-bengoshi in-house lawyers as
their agents.
Fourth, Upjohn memorandum should be utilized to establish
that communications between corporations and in-house lawyers are
protected under the attorney-client privilege. 282 The memorandum is
intended to eliminate any doubt regarding whether the
communication was for the purposes of seeking legal advice or merely

See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of
276.
the privilege to foreign licensed lawyers).
See supra text accompanying notes 272-73 (analyzing the reasonable
277.
expectation of Japanese corporations and encouragement of compliance with U.S. law).
278.

FUJITA, supra note 85, at 281.

Id.
279.
See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing the use of in280.
house lawyers as a shield).
See id. (discussing the use of in-house lawyers as a shield).
281.
282.

See 2 THOMAS P. HESTER ET AL., SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE

AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 35:8 (Robert L. Haig ed., 2007) [hereinafter SUCCESSFUL
PARTNERING] (explaining Upjohn memorandum). The memorandum derives its name
from Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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a routine business activity. 28 3 The memorandum should also be
marked "Confidential-Attorney-Client Privilege" to show that
2 84
confidentiality was desired from the inception of the memorandum.
The memorandum should receive limited distribution only to those
necessary or present during the communications; otherwise, the
285
privilege may be deemed waived.
In addition to the Upjohn memorandum, the legal department
may consider having blank forms that must be filled out to open new
"matters" to which an in-house lawyer devotes time.2 86 The form will
require in-house lawyers to describe exactly what legal advice he is
287
being asked and by whom.
D. What Can the JapaneseGovernment Do to Support
Japanese Corporations?
Although it would be difficult to protect all communications
between a Japanese corporation and its non-bengoshi in-house
lawyers under the current law, there are three possibilities the
Japanese government may want to consider to protect Japanese
corporations from exposing their confidential information. First, the
Japanese government may expressly extend application of the
attorney-client privilege to non-bengoshi in-house lawyers under the
Hague Evidence Convention. 288 Discovery from non-U.S. defendants
can be taken according to the FRCP or the Hague Evidence
Convention. 289 Though Japan is not a current signatory to the
Convention, Japan may sign the Convention with declarations and
2 90
reservations as to the attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel.
Alternatively, the Japanese government could amend the CCP to
include non-bengoshi in-house lawyers as professionals who have a
duty of confidentiality to the client. 29 1 Under the Eisai reasoning,
U.S. courts would likely extend the privilege to non-bengoshi in-house

283.
2 THOMAS P. HESTER ET AL., supra note 282, § 35:8.
284.
Carole Basri & Benjamin Nahoum, Update on How In-House Lawyer Can
Use and Expand the Privileges,THE METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., June 1996, at 48.
285.
Id.
286.
VILLA, supra note 55, § 1.16.
287.
Id.
288.
The Japanese government is currently hesitant to sign the Convention. See
In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp at 55 ("Japan did not join the Hague
Convention apparently out of fear of American-type discovery procedures ....
").
Whether Japanese government is inclined to do so in the future is beyond the scope of
this Note.
289.
See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text (explaining the application
of discovery rules at international level).
290.
See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 71, at art. 11 ("In the
execution of a Letter of Request the person concerned may refuse to give evidence in so
far as he has a privilege or duty to refuse to give the evidence .... ").
291.
See supra Part III.B (discussing the attorney-client privilege in Japan).
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lawyers if they were extended the privilege under the Japanese
29 2
law.
Most importantly, bar passage rate for graduates from new
Japanese law schools should be raised while maintaining the quality
of practical education for legal professionals. Because the numbers of
approved new schools and admitted students were greater than
expected, the actual passage rate for the 2006 exam was 48%.293
More than half of the graduates, therefore, might have to practice
without a bar membership. If Japanese corporations are to hire those
non-licensed graduates as in-house lawyers, U.S. courts would likely
deny the extension of the privilege because U.S. law school graduates
who have not been admitted to the bar may not be considered an
294
attorney for the purpose of the privilege.

VII. CONCLUSION

As to the communications between a Japanese corporation and
its non-bengoshi in-house lawyers, U.S. courts would most likely
recognize the attorney-client privilege only for a manager of a legal
department of the Japanese corporation under Remy-Maltin/Minolta
test. The situation, however, will change in the near future when
Japanese corporations start retaining bengoshi, who have graduated
from new Japanese law schools, as in-house lawyers. Meanwhile,
Japanese corporations may still be able to protect confidential
information through the use of a legal manager, U.S. or Japanese
licensed in-house lawyers, in-house lawyers acting as agents, and the
Upjohn memorandum. The Japanese government may also be able to
support Japanese corporations by signing the Hague Evidence
Convention with declarations and reservations, amending the CCP's
provision regarding the privilege, and most importantly, by raising
bar passage rate for graduates of Japanese law schools. These
measures would more likely protect confidential corporate
information, regardless of whether U.S. courts recognize the attorneyclient privilege for Japanese non-bengoshi in-house lawyers.
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